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PREFACE

The purpose of this study is to analyze
Supreme Court pronouncements concerning a right
of public access to criminal proceedings in order
to determine to what extent the Court has recognized a constitutional guarantee of a public trial
as it may apply to the accused and to the public
and press.

Because the question of public access

to the courtroom is a relatively new one, this
study is principally centered on recent cases which
were decided exclusively by the Burger Court, providing a unique opportunity for a "case study."
Consequently, a secondary thrust of the study is an
analysis of the decision-making process of the present Court as demonstrated by a limited number of
cases in a limited area.
Chapter I is devoted to a search for constitutional bases for a guarantee of public access to
the courtroom, including an examination of general
character, historical grounding in cor.imon law and
custom, and sources in the First Amendment, the
Sixth Amendment, the Ninth Amendment, and the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U. S. Constitution.

Chapter II considers

and analyzes the parameters of a guarantee in terms
iii

of qualifications, limitations, and restrictions
in order to determine the applicability of the
Court's definition of a right of access.

Finally,

Chapter III evaluates the Burger Court's decisionmaking in the courtroom access cases.

An attempt

is made to analyze the Court's judgments in the larger context of the long-standing free press-fair trial
debate and the relatively currentconcern for a general
right of access to governmental activities and proceedings.
The reader should be cautioned that this is a
limited study of a limited area which does not attempt
to address the many broader questions suggested herein.
There is no attempt, for example, to address policy
considerations or to make normative judgments.
short~

In

the study attempts to discover what the Court

has said on one narrow constitutional question and,
in terms of consistency, clarity and practical applicability, how well it has spoken.
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INTRODUCTION

There are certain assumptions underlying any
democratic system of government.

The most essential

one is that government is under popular control, that

it is responsive.to popular will and subject to popular scrutiny.

The American system presupposes the

spirit of the Declaration of Independence in that the
purpose of government is to "ensure" rather than to
"deprive" and that when deprivation becomes necessary,
such deprivation be accomplished within the bounds of
law, fairly conceived and fairly administered.
It is an irony of such a system that dedication
to fair treatment of individuals (as in the right to
a fair trial) appears on occasion to conflict with
dedication to popular control of government (as in
the right to free speech and free press).

Perhaps

such a conflict is endemic to the system and there
is no evidence that the framers of the Constitution
had any solutions other than those which would be devised in the on-going "practice" of self-government.
Much attention has been paid to the adversarial
character of certain rights and nowhere moreso than
in the fair trial-free press debate.

Only recently

has there been much attention paid, and appropriately
so, to the symbiotic relationship between fairness to
v

the accused and the right of the press (acting as a
surrogate of the people) to scrutinize an institution of the government.

As the courts have worked out

techniques of courtroom management that protect the
Sixth Amendment rights of the accused, concern has
been focussed on not infringing on the areas of First
Amendment rights so critical to self-government.

More-

over, there is a recognition that the public has an
interest in fair trial and the accused has an interest
in open institutions of government.
The issue of access has added a new dimension to
the old fair trial-free press debate.

Prior to 1979,

the only case in which the Court had considered the
issue of public trial directly was in 1948 in In
Oliver.

.££,

But unlike Oliver, the Gannett case in 1979

involved acquiescence of the accused so that the challenge was brought, not by the parties directly involved in the case, but rather by those arguing for
an independent right of access for the public and
the press.

Indeed, the closure of courtrooms was not

a significant issue until trial judges began closing
courtrooms following the 1976 Nebraska ruling in which
the Supreme Court struck down gag orders but left open
the question of closure as a means of protecting trials
from potentially harmful publicity.
Access to the courtroom has not been an isolated
issue but

rathe~

• a part of a larger concern about
as

vi

public access to all governmental institutions and
activities.

This concern is demonstrated in numer-

ous cases in the decade of the '?O's, some emerging
from the Watergate incident, concerning such issues
as access to prisons, government attempt to halt
publication of sensitive material, reporter's privilege, and general freedom of information.

As a result,

Constitutional scholars and Court observers have been
grappling with the broader issue, within these contexts, of the existence and extent of a "right to know".
It is an issue which has yet to be definitively resolved by the Supreme Court of the United States.

vii

I.

CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR A RIGHT OF ACCESS
The practice of conducting criminal trials in

public is a recognized feature of American judicial
proceedings.

It is a practice with strong antecedents

in English common law, in the courts of colonial America,
and in the constitutions ~f the states.1

The Sixth

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that "in
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
privilege of a speedy and public trial."
The source of the practice in the American systern is traceable in English constitutional history to
early Anglo-Saxon custom which was preserved and continued by the early Norman kings after the conquest
of England in 1066.

The Assize of Clarendon in 1166

gave evidence of and statutory requirement for the
English practice of attendance of freemen at trials
as a duty.2

The Frankish contribution to the system

took the form of introducing the practice of conducting
inquests by jury.

As royal justice spread, the Anglo-

Saxon tradition of openness was maintained as a
1Forty-five states have specific constitutional
guarantees of public trial. See Gannett Co. Inc.
v. DePasquale, 99 S.Ct. 2898 (1979), Blackmun
dissenting, note 3, p. 2923.
2carl Stephenson and Frederick G. Marcham, ed.,
Sources of English Constitutional Histor~ (New
York and London 1 . Harper and Brothers, 1937),
p. 76.
1

procedural matter and became the hand-maiden of
the jury system. Indeed, there is evidence that
the early Norman kings used the public proceedings
as a way of demonstrating and extending the power
of the king's justice across the land.
The practice of open trials preceded any recognition of rights for the accused.

The infamous Star

Chamber was attacked not for in camera proceedings
but for the complete lack of protection for the accused in such matters as the confronting of witnesses,
the calling of witnesses, the use of torture to extract information or confessions, and trial by an
independent, uncoerced jury.

Rights for the accused

were finally won during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries as common law lawyers and judges united with
Parliament to abolish not only the Star Chamber but
similar practices in other courts as well.

During the

entire period of struggle for the establishment of
rights for

the defendant, the practice of holding

inquests and trials in public enjoyed an unbroken tradition.

Eventually, the public trial was recognized

as a right of free citizens and as an element of a
fair trial, inasmuch as openness protected the other
fundamental rights from abuse.
J"Legal Historys Origins of the Public Trial,"
Ind. L.J. 35: 251-255 (1960), P• 255. For
additional sources on English constitutional
2

Hale, Blackstone, Bentham4 and others have discussed the tradition of public trial in terms of benefit to the Crown (or to the people) and the effective
administration of justice, rather than in terms of beneficience to the accused,

All have emphasized the im-

portance of open proceedings in preserving the appearance
of available justice and insuring the integrity of the
system.

Blackstone, citing Hale, emphasized the im-

portance of publicity in his comment that ",,.the open
examination of witnesses

viva~.

in the presence of

all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up
of truth than the private and secret examination before
an officer or his clerk ••• 5
11

The practice of open trials was firmly established
in English common law at the time of the formation of
the American colonies and, indeed, the writings of
Hale and Blackstone were well-knovm to colonial leaders
at the time of the American revolution and had great
impact.

It is reasonable to assume that the practice

history, see F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional
History of England (Cambridge: University Press,
1961); E. Coke, J..nstitutes of the Laws of England
103 (6th ed. 1681); I.W. Holdsworth, A History
of English Law (1927)1 F. Pollack, The Expansion
of the Common Law 140; also Hale, Blackstone,
and Bentham, note 4 infra; Radin, note 5 infra.
4M. Hale, The Histor of the Common Law of En land
(6th ed. 1.20 1 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on
the I,aws of England *.3721 J. Bentham, The Rationale
of Judicial Evidence (1827) and Treatise on
Judicial Evidence (1825).
5commentaries, III, c. 2.3, II, p. 375, Jones' ed.,
p.1983, quoted from Radin, "The Right to a
Public Trial," Temple L.Q. 6r 381-388 (1932),
pp. 382-383.

3

in America was generally recognized as having the
dual purpose of maintaining judicial integrity and
assuring a fair trial to the populace and for the
accused.6

There is no evidence that courts were

closed during colonial times.

Furthermore, the prac-

tice was explicitly promulgated in early colonial
charters, documents of rights, and state constitutions.

For an example, the Pennsylvania Frame of

Government (1682) specified that "all courts shall be
open."7
It is clear that at the time of the framing of
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the universally common practice in the United States was one of
open trials.

The Sixth Amendment, which contains the

only explicit mention of public trial, is framed in
terms of the accused.

In addition, other provisions

of the Constitution, according to commentators on the
American constitutional system and pronouncements of
the Supreme Court, have been found to speak implicitly
to the openness of judicial proceedings.8 Specifically,
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the First Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment have been' considered pertinent to the analysis and
finding of a public trial right in the U.S. Constitution.
6"0rigins of the Public Trial," p. 256.
?Quoted from Gannett v. DePasquale 99 S.Ct. 2898
( 1979) , 2 92 9.
8see text and notes supra and infra.

4

The Sixth Amendment
Having been framed explicitly in terms of the
accused, the wording of the Sixth Amendment has precipitated some controversy as to whether or not the
framers intended that right to belong solely to the
accused or whether the guarantees of the amendment
extend beyond the interests of the accused to the interests of the public as well.

In Gannett v. DePasquale

(1979), the Supreme Court, for the first time, directly
addressed itself to the question of a public trial
right independent of the accused.

At issue in that

case was an order by a state court which barred the
public and press from a

pret~ial

suppression hearing.

In the opinion handed down by the Court, the justices
(with one exception9) limited their search to an analysis of the Sixth Amendment.

The reasoning in the

majority opinion and the concurring and dissenting
opinions is instructive.lo
Justice Stewart, who wrote for the Court (in
which only Justice Stevens joined without a separate
opinion), took the narrow view of the Sixth Amendment,
9powell addressed the First Amendment question,
Gannett, p. 2914.
lOThe decision to uphold the state court's order
for closure was by 5-4 vote. The impact and
meaning of the decision in regard to a right
of access was unclear.

5

finding in it no independent constitutional right
of the public to attend criminal proceedings.

Hold-

ing that the sole purpose of the Sixth Amendment is
protection of the accused, Stewart based his argument
on the lack of specific Constitutional mention of a
right of access for the public. 11 . Borrowing Blackmun•s
dissent in Faretta v. California12 that the "specific
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are personal to the
accused," Stewart went on to cite case precedent 1 3 and
commentary in several law review articles which support that contention.14
While noting that the public has a strong societal interest in the conduct of trials,15 and that
the tradition of public proceedings was established
in common law, Stewart argued a differentiation between
11

Gannett, p. 2905.

12 95 s.ct. 2525 (1975), 2547.
1 3rn re Oliver 68 s.ct. 499 (1948), note 25,

P.

506; Estes v. Texas 85 s.ct. 1628 (1965),
1653.

14Gannett, p. 2906. In citing Radin, Stewart may
be misrepresenting the thrust of the commentary
which argued for limitations on public access
rather than against a right of public access
J2er ~·,
1 5see Estes v. Texas 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1653, for
an explication of societal interests.

6

an "interest" anq a "right," noting that not all common law rules have been elevated to the status of
Constitutional rights.16

He further asserted that

the interest of the public is adequately represented
by the prosecutor, judge, and the jury, noting that a
defendant is not permitted to waive his right to a
jury trial without the consent of the judge and the
prosecutor.17
Justice Powell concurred with the finding regarding the Sixth Am~ndment18 as did Justice Rehnquist,
the latter taking the hardest line in regard to closure.
It may be noted that as a result of Singer v. u.s.19,
a defendant cannot compel a private trial.

At issue

in this case, according to the opinion of the Court 20
and the Rehnquist concurrence~l was whether closure is
prohibited by the Sixth Amendment if the participants
in the litigation agree to do so.

The Rehnquist answer

was an emphatic "no."
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan,
White, and Marshall, dissented from the principal
16Burger agreed with this distinction, Gannett,
P• 291.3 •
17Gannett, pp. 2907-2908.
1 Bsee text infra for Powell's position concerning other Constitutional provisions.
1935 s.ct. 783 (1965).
20aannett, p. 2907.
2laannett, p. 2918.

7

findings of the majority22in regard to the Sixth
Amendment and the question of public access to the
courtroom. Finding a strong and unbroken tradition
of open proceedings in the common law andex>lonial antecedents as well as the original understanding of the
Sixth Amendment, Blackmun found no basis for permitting
closure of criminal proceedings, even with the defendant's concurrence.23 He noted that in the case' of In
!.!!. Oliver, the Court could find no instance at any
level in the history of the U.S. in which courts had
been closed to the public and none in England since
the abolition of the St~r Chamber in 1641. 24 Furthermore, the Court has consistently recognized the importance and beneficial effects of open and public
trials to the system of justice.25
Blackmun took issue with the narrow interpretation
given to the Sixth Amendment in Stewart's opinion by
noting that the Court has previously recognized that
the amendment may go beyond the interests of the accused to include other interests as well. In Barker
v. Wingo26 dealing with the right to a speedy trial,
in Singer v. u.s. 2 7 dealing with the right to trial
by jury, and in Faretta v. California28 dealing with
22 Blackmun et.al.concurred only on the question
of mootness.
23The defendant had concurred in this instance.
2401iver, p. 504. See note 13 supra.
2 5see Craig v. Harney 67 S.Ct. 1249 (1947)1
Sheppard v. Maxwell 86 S.Ct. 1507 (1966); In
re Oliver 68 s.ct. 499 (1948)1 Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn 95 S.Ct. 1029 {1975)1 Pennekamp
v. Florida 66 s.ct. 1029 (1946)1 and others.
26 92 s.ct. 21s2 (1972).
2 7see note 19 supra.
28 see note 12 supra.
8

the right to counsel, the Court has refused to reject
societal interests in its considerations.

Blackmun

put particular emphasis on the Singer decision in supporting his contention that the casting of a right in
terms of the accused gives no right to the defendant
to compel the opposite, in this case, a closed
proceeding.29
After reviewing the historical antecedents and
relying heavily on StoryAs commentaries published in
l833,30 Blackmun concluded that the public feature of
trials was assumed by the framers and that nothing
exists to suggest that, by framing an amendment in
terms of the accused, the accused would have the power
to close proceedings to the public.

The societal in-

terests in the fair, efficient administration of justice are too overwhelming to have been ignored then
or now.

Societal interests in protecting against per-

jury, providing opportunity for new witnesses to come
forward, and in deciding cases on the basis of truth
and complete information do not always work to the
interest of the accused.

In addition, openness serves

to provide public scrutiny of the behavior of the
police, prosecutors, and judges, to educate the public on the administration of the system, and to maintain
2 9Gannett, pp. 2924-2925.
30J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of
the u.s. 662 (1833),

9

public confidence in that system, all of which are essential to the exercise of self-government.31
While giving a broad reading to the Sixth Amendment, Blackmun admitted no absolute requirement for
open trials.

Recognizing limitations on public access,32

he nonetheless rejected the notion that excluding unruly spectators, for example, provides precedent for
closing the proceedings to all.

He noted that the

majority could cite no case in which the public was
totally excluded from proceedings.33

He also ad-itted

the necessity of protecting the defendant's right to
a fair trial, particularly where publicity may prejudice
the defense.

Even though exceptions may exist, the pre-

sumption of an open trial demands that grounds for
closure must be "narrowly drawn" and that the defendant
must establish that closure is "strictly and inescapably
necessary.".34

In no instance is the burden on the pub-

lic to provide justification for maintaining an open
proceeding.35
Despite the longstanding perception that conflict
exists between the rights of the press and rights
3 1Gannett, PP• 2930-Jl.
3 2see Chapter 2 for a more extensive discussion
of limitations.
33aannett, note 11, p. 2931.
34Gannett, P• 2936.
35see Chapter,2 for a discussion of closure
standards.
10

regarding fair trial, traditionally cast as a First
versus Sixth Amendment conflict, Blackmun was not
convinced that the interests of the public and rights
of a defendant are incompatible.

To the contrary,

publicity threats to fair trial are not always so
unmanageable, as seen in Nebraska Press Association
v. Stuart36 and Murphy v. Florida37, as to prevent
fair trial.

In those cases where the Court has reversed

convictions because of publicity, that publicity was
abnormally high.38

Indeed, the harm anticipated is

largely speculative.39
The Blackmun opinion concluded that the public
right of access to criminal proceedings in the Sixth
Amendment includes the press as well.

Both Sheppard

v. Maxwe1140 and Nebraska v. Stuart41 support the right
of the press to report events occurring in the courtroom.

Reporters "are entitled to the same rights as

the general public" in regard to access.42
3 6 96 s.ct. 2791 (1976), See text and notes supra.
3795 s.ct. 2031 (1975). The case was marked by
a high degree of publicity.
3gSuch as Irvin v. Dowd 81 S.Ct. 1639 (1961); Rideau
v. Louisiana 83 S.Ct. 1417 (1963); Sheppard v.
Maxwell 86 S.Ct. 1507 (1966); Estes v. Texas
85 s.ct. 1628 (1965).
39Gannett, p. 2938.
40sheppard, p. 1522. See text and notes supra,
particularly Chapter II.
41 Nebraska, p. 2807.

42Estes, p. 1631 quoted in Gannett,
11

p. 2939.

In regard to the Sixth Amendment, the Gannett
case presented the question of whether or not the
public has a right, independent of the parties directly involved in a case, to attend criminal proceedings.43
That the public has an interest in judicial proceedings is generally recognized.

Whether that interest

constitutes a right in the Sixth Amendment is disputed.
Burger, Stewart, Stevens, Rehnquist, and Powell would
appear to find no such right; Brennan, White, Blackmun,
and Marshall did.

But the right of public access to

the courtroom was not settled even by a 5-4 decision
on the issue.

The plethora of opinions created dif-

ficulties on a number of questions.

One was the failure

of the opinion to make a clear distinction between pretrial and trial procedures.

Another was the fact that

only Justice Powell was willing to look beyond the
Sixth Amendment for a constitutional basis for a right
to attend trials on the part of the public and press.
4 3There is federal court authority supporting
both positions. Geise v. U.S. (1959, CA 9
Alaska) 265 F 2d 659 and Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas (1957, DC Pa) 153 F
Supp 486, affd (CA 3 Pa) 254 F 2d 883 support
the Sixth Amendment inuring solely to the accused. That the right to public trial in the
Sixth Amendment belongs also to the public in
general, see U.S. v. Cianfrani (1978, CA 3 Pa)
573 F 2d 835, U.S. v. Kobli (1949, CA 3 Pa)
172 F 2d 919, U.S. ~· rel. Mayberry v. Yeager
(1971, DC NJ) 321 F Supp 199, and U.S. v. Lopez
(1971, ED NY) 328 F Supp 1077, 14 ALR Fed 252.

12

The First Amendment
The result of the Gannett decision was widespread confusion as to the nature and extent of the
ruling.

More than 300 motions to close criminal court

proceedings followed, more than 200 of which were
granted.44

Such was the confusion that four justices

made public comments in an effort to clarify the decision, particularly as to its applicability to
trials.45

Despite their efforts, the Court eventually

granted certiorari to review the closure of a trial
in Virginia on appeal by Richmond Newspapers, Inc. and
in this instance addressed the question of public access to the courtroom in the First Amendment.46
While the Gannett decision did not reach a First
Amendment right of access, some reference was made to
it.

The language of the Stewart opinion is interest-

ing in this regard for the Justice seemed to indicate
that if such a right did exist, the trial court had
given appropriate deference to it by its actions in
4 4 Bill Winter, "Richmond Case Widens Access, Spawns
Debate," ABAJ 661 946-947 (August 1980).

4.5n.G. Stephenson, Jr., "Fair Trial - Free Press1

Rights.in Continuing Conflict," Brooklyn L.R. 46:
39-66 (Fall 1979),

46 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia 100 S.Ct.
2814 (1980). The First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution says that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of reliqion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances."
13

ordering closure.

Specifically, he said "several

factors lead to the conclusion that the actions of
the trial judge here were consistent with any right
of access (my emphasis) the petitioner may have under
the First and Fourteenth

Amendment~"

Stewart empha-

sized that the trial judge had conducted a proceeding
to hear objections to the motion for closure, had
balanced the rights of the press and public against
the rights of the defendant, and had concluded that
a "reasonable probability for prejudice" existed.

Sig-

nificantly, he explicitly interpreted the balancing
as being' one of competing societal interests rather
than being grounded in any First Amendment freedoms.47
There is no indication that Stewart (and Stevens or
Burger, by implication) rejected a First Amendment
basis.

Neither did they choose to reach it in the

Gannett case.
As noted above, Powell went straight to the First
Amendment issue in the Gannett case (he did not participate in the Richmond Newspapers case).

Without

extensive rationale, he based his finding of a right
of public access on the public's need to have accurate
information about the operation of the system and the
f idiciary role of the press in providing that information to the public.

Recognizing limitations on that

right, and the responsibility of the trial court to
47Gannett, p. 2912.

14

guard the right to a fair trial for the defendant,
he was concerned that a constitutional standard be
provided for trial judges in making judgments and
moved to the task of defining the parameters of such
a standard in light of due process imperatives.48
In both the Gannett and Richmond cases~9 Justice
Rehnquist flatly denied a First Amendment guarantee.
Contending that the Court has refused to recognize
such a right in the past, he cited Nixon v. Warner
Communications~O Pell v. Procunier~l Branzburg v.
Hayes~2 Zemel v. Rusk~3 Estes v. Texas, and Houchins

v. KQEn.54

But Rehnquist was the exception, for of

the eight justices participating in the Richmond decision, seven found a right of public access to the
courtroom in the First Amendment.
The judgment of the Court in the Richmond case
was announced by Chief Justice Warren Burger but no
one joined his opinion.

Instead the other justices

48 Gannett, PP• 2914-2915.
4 9Gannett, p. 2918 and Richmond, p. 2843.
509g

s.ct.

1306 ( 1978).

5194 s.ct. 2800 (1974).

52 92 s.ct. 2646 ( 1972).

5335 s.ct. 1271 ( 1965).
5498 s.ct. 2588 ( 1978).
15

participated in the three concurring opinions filed
in the case.

As in the Gannett case, the Court did

not speak with one voice except in the finding of a
First Amendment right.
Citing historical evidence of a tradition of open
trials and the strong presumption of openness inhering
in the American system of justice, Burger concluded
that the societal interests in keeping trials open
were basic to the American system of a government controlled by the people, and that the press played an
essential role in informing the public~5

He demon-

strated no concern, as he did in the Gannett case,
with the lack of explicit Constitutional mention of
the right in terms of the public but was content that
the Bill of Rights were adopted on a "backdrop" of
a long history of open trials and concluded that the
right to attend "gives meaning'' to the explicit guarantees of the First Amendment56
In this vein, he noted that "free speech carries
with it some freedom to listen" citing several cases
which support a broad reading of the First Amendment
to allow a full range of activities in support of First
Amendment rights to free speech, press, and assembly.
For example, he quoted language from Kliendienst v.
55Richmond, p. 2825.

56Richmond, p. 2827.
16

Mande157("right to receive information"), and from
Branzburg v. Hayes5 8 ("right to gather information"),
and concluded that such rights would have no meaning
without a corollary "right to access''.

The rights to

speech and press would be empty without a right to information~9 The trial judge erred in not giving full

consideration to these rights in making a judgment regarding closure~O (The judge was acting in part on a
Virginia statute which allowed closure at the discretion of the trial judge.)
The Stevens concurrence 61 is noteworthy for its
discussion of two past cases which would seem to deny
right of access or a "right to know".62

In Saxbe v.

Washington Post, the Court had allowed restrictions
on the press so long as such restrictions did not
single out the press in a discriminatory way.

Justices

Brennan, Marshall, and Powell took strong exception to
the conclusion.

In Houchins v. KQED, Justices Brennan

and Powell were joined by Justice Stevens in objecting
5792 s.ct. 2 57 6 ( 1 97 2 ) ' 2581.
5892 s.ct. 2646, 2656.
59Richmond, p. 2°82?.
60Richmond, P• 2829.
6lRichmond, pp. 2830-Jl.
6 2see Rehnquist dissent in Gannett.
17

to similar restrictions permitted by the Court•s
opinion on the flow of information.

Stevens con-

cluded that had Blackmun and Marshall participated
in the Houchins decision the Court•s conclusions
would have been quite different.

He further noted

the irony in the Court's willingness to recognize
a right of access of the press to the courtroom
in the instant case while the Court was willing
to deny a right of access to prison facilities
(Houchins), particularly given his perception that
the general public has a more powerful ability to
voice objections than do prisoners.
In the first part of the Richmond opinion in
which they concur in the judgment, Justices Brennan
and Marshall also deal with the Saxbe and Houchins
cases, as well as Pell v. Procunier, Zemel v. Rusk,
and Estes v. Texas, in which the Court seems to have
refused to recognize an enforceable right of access to information about government operations.
They caution a careful reading of those cases and
confine the rulings to a recognition by the Court
that such access is

~subject

to a degree of restraint

dictated by the nature of the information and countervailing interests in security or confidentiality,"
concluding that these cases can be cited as neither
upholding or denying a right of public access to
18

information.

Employing the terms "freedom of expres-

sion" and implying terms such as "freedom of communication" and "right to gather information", these
Justices promulgate the theory that the First Amendment
has a greater role than mere protection, to wit, it
also has the "structural role" of fostering and promoting a meaningful exercise of what it protects.63
This theory was not. newly proposed here but was
expressed by Brennan in an address printed in the
Rutgers Law Review in 1979,

There Brennan proposed

two models dealing with the rights of the press.
One was the "speech model" which he defined as deserving absolutist protection.

The other, the

"structural model", includes an umbrella of all
press functions, such as newsgathering and news
disseminating, which had to be weighed against
other societal interests.

Responding to protests

by the press to the Gannett decision, Brennan asserted that neither model fit the particular situation in that case since the concerns were for the
rights of the public as well as the press and because
Gannett was cqnfined to ruling on the Sixth rather
than the First Amendment.64

Since the Court finally

63Richmond, pp. 2832-2833.
64 Brennan, "Address," Rutgers L.R. 32,
(1979), PP• 181-182.
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173-186

reached the First Amendment question in the Richmond
case, he could employ the "structural model" and, in
fact, does so in providing an analytical structure
for his opinion.
Use of the structural model means that Brennan
was basing his findings not just on history and tradition, but also on the values served in maintaining
popular control of the activities and institutions of
government.

Trials, being a genuine governmental

proceeding, must be accessible in order to provide a
check on trial procedures and in order to enhance the
factfinding function of the courts through publicity.65
The availability of transcripts at the end of the trial
is "no substitute for" the actual presence of people
at tria1. 66
Due Process - The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
The Fifth Amendment (U.S. Constitution) guarantees that

"~o

person shall ••• be deprived of life,

liberty or property, without due process of law •••• "
The Fourteenth Amendment (U.S. Constitution) states
" ••• nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property,. without due process of law •••• "
The due proce~s clauses as applied to criminal procedures have been held, over the long course of the
65Richmond, p. 2838.
66Richmond, P• 28J9.
20

Court's history, to mean that procedures must be
fair.

Fair procedures were those provided specifi-

cally in Amendments Four, Five, Six, and Seven (U.

s.

Constitution).
In its early history, the Court held to a doctrine that certain guarantees were applicable only to
the national government.

It did so even after it

demonstrated willingness to apply First Amendment
guarantees to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.67
This allowed the Court to reform federal procedures
without

movin~

into state procedures, which it began

to do as early as 1914 with Weeks v. U.S.~ The process
was accomplished in a case-by-case, incremental manner with much importance being given to the safeguards
listed in the Bill of Rights and the onus being placed
on federal judges to guard the purity and fairness of
procedures which were deemed essential to liberty and
fairness.69
In the matter of state procedures, the Court intervened only against the most blatant of state practices.

Despite a sensitivity to procedural rights,

6 7see Gitlow v. N.Y. 278 U.S. 652 (1925),

68 232

u.s.

J83 (1914).

69M. Shapiro and D. Hobbs, The Politics of
Constitutional Law with revisions (Cambridge,
Mass., Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1974), pp.
300-301.
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the Court showed a reluctance to soften judicial
self-restraint and interfere with the states.

In-

stead, the Court began to apply (by the early 4o's)
a fair trial rule in which it refused to strike down
state proceedings based on a violation of a specific
Bill of Rights provision, but rather preferred to
decide "on the basis of the totality of the circumstances whether the trial as a whole had been 'fair'."70
The rule, in practice, proved to be vague and
was gradually eroded in a number of incremental decisions in which the Court incorporated various
provisions of the Bill of Rights into the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.71

This slow pro-

cess culminated in Mapp v. Ohio in which the Court,
for the first time, made a criminal procedure element of the Bill of Rights directly applicable to
the States? 2

The case was followed by others, such

as Gideon v. Wainwright?3 Escobedo v. Illinois,74
70shapiro, p. 240.
7 1shapiro, p. 241.
72 367 U.S. 643 (1961), specifically the search
and seizure provision of the Fourth Amendment.
73372 U.S. 335 (1963), the right to counsel in
the Sixth Amendment.
74378 U.S •. 478 (1964), the right to counsel and
the right against self-incrimination in the
Sixth and Fifth Amendments respectively.
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Miranda v. Arizona75, and Duncan v. Louisiana76,
in which the Court clearly established a uniform,
national policy of procedural standards on the
states and localities.77
In the matter of a public trial, the key case
in which the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment may hold a basis for a right was In
(1948).

~

Oliver

Repeated reference was made to it in the

opinions profferred in the current public trial cases
discussed above.

In Oliver, the Court specifically

ruled that failure to provide a public trial was a
violation of due process of law.

Justice Black cited

the heritage of English common law and what he referred to as "the universal rule against secret trials."
He also noted that the open trial was "an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial ... 78
Without specifically discussing them, Justice Black
made reference to other benefits which public trials
may "confer upon our society."
75384 U.S. 436 (1966), the right to be advised
of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by police.
76 391 u.s,. 146 .(1968), the right to a jury trial
in the Sixth Amendment.
77shapiro, p. 305.· For addition~! discussion of
the incorporation of the fair trial amendments,
see H. Abraham, Freedom and the Court (New Yorks
Oxford University Press, 1977), PP• 71-8).
78oliver, p. 503.
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The Court has applied the due process guarantee in the Fourteenth Amendment in other cases as
well.

For example, it did so in Mayberry v. Pennsyl-

vania79 and in Baker v. Utecht.BO

Subsequently, in

all of the recent cases dealing with a right to a public trial in state proceedings, whether based on First
or Sixth Amendment grounds, the Fourteenth Amendment
has been incorporated.

Seldom, however, has there been

direct reference in these cases to specific due process grounds.

Due process considerations do come into

play where various justices attempt to establish procedures for limiting attendance at trials or for actual closure.

These will be discussed in Chapter 2.

In the case of Levine v. u.s.,81

the Court

ruled that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment requires a public proceedine.

Likewise, in a

more recent case in federal court, U.S. v. Cianfrani,82
a presumption of openness was held essential to due
process.

The Third Circuit court also upheld the

right of access in the Sixth Amendment, finding an
independent public right in order to promote societal
interests.
7991 s.ct. 499 (1971),
B06s s.ct. 204 (1947).

B1so s.ct. 1605 (1960).
82 (1978, CA3 Pa) 573 F2d 835.
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The Ninth Amendment
The Ninth Amendment (U.S. Constitution) states
that "the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people."

In the Richmond opin-

ion, Chief Justice Burger.used the Ninth Amendment to
refute the argument that no right to attend public
trials is protected by the U.S. Constitution because
there is no specific mention of such a right.

Noting

that the Founding Fathers included this amendment in
order "to allay fears" about the possible exclusion
of rights not enumerated, 83and that the Court has
previously acknowledged some rights as being implicit,
Burger held that the right to attend public trials
was implicit in the First Amendment.84
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in the Richmond
case, flatly and without exception, rejected the use
of the Ninth Amendment as pertinent to the case.

No

other justice made use of Ninth Amendment grounds for
determining the case, although the substance of the
Ninth Amendment was implicit in their constitutional
interpretations of the First Amendment.
The Ninth Amendment has been largely disregarded
by scholars and Supreme Court Justices.

Authored by

83Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, #84,
84Richmond, p. 2829.
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James Madison, it grew out of his apprehension that
the enumeration of rights in the Bill of Rights might
be construed as a denial of other unenumerated rights.
The amendment assumes that unenumerated rights exist
which require protection and supports the principle
of limited government inherent in the letter and
spirit of the Constitution.
amendment were to be

tak~n

If the inclusion of the
seriously in constitutional

analysis, it would not be outside the purview of a body
engaged in judicial review to search for those rights.
The Supreme Court has recognized the existence
of penumbras to the Bill of Rights, that is, that
certain rights emanate from the enumerated rights
which give those guarantees life and substance.

The

notion that unenumerated rights are those which enhance the exercise of free and open government would
certainly support a claim that a right of access to
criminal trials supports and fulfills a constitutional
scheme of informed discussion protected by the First
Amendment.

That is precisely the argument made by the

concurring Justices in the Richmond case, without recourse to the N,inth Amendment.
The very open-ended character of rights provided
by the Ninth Amendment may very well be the reason for
the reluctance to employ it.

Justice Hugo Black es-

sentially ignored the provision and he was noted for

26

judicial activism and interpretivism.

It is, perhaps,

no wonder that others, with Black, would find the
jurisprudential implications of the provision cause
for discomfort.

A too enthusiastic embracing of the

amendment may not serve principled judicial enforcement but might instead so enhance the Court's _function
of judicial review as to seriously overwhelm the political branches of government in a manner inconsistent
with a commitment to representative democracy.

Cer-

tainly those who advocate judicial restraint-might
think so and continue to ignore the Ninth Amendment. 8 5
8 5see Charles W. Dennis, Jr., "A First and
Ninth Amendment Theory of a Right of Access
to Criminal Trials," West New England L.R. 21
723-758 (Spring 1980) and John H. Ely,
Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge and London:
Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. J4-41.
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II.

QUALIFICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON A RIGHT OF ACCESS
Given that the consensus of the Supreme Court

(all but Rehnquist) is

that some right of public

access to judicial proceedings exists, difficulties
arise when one is faced with the task of defining the
parameters of such a right.

If the Court's finding

of a right seems strained and circuitous in terms of
constitutional sources, it is even more so in terms
of temporal questions of applicability to the totality
of the judicial process, in terms of functional limitations on access, and in terms of standards of limitation on access and how they are to be imposed.
As mentioned above, the Court in Gannett v.

DePasquale~ failed to make a clear statement as to
the applicability of the ruling on trials asopposed
to pre-trial proceedings.

The result of that fail-

ure was widespread confusion as to the scope of the
ruling as it applied to full trials.

At issue in

the Gannett case was closure of a pre-trial hearing;
the substance of the decision, by

5-4 vote, was no

finding of a Sixth Amendment right of access to pretrial proceedings.

1 99

But the decision of the Court was

s.ct. 2898 (1979).
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not definitive.

Justice Stewart often used the

terms "trial" and "pre-trial" interchangeably in
his opinion for the Court, making unclear the applicability of his judgment to trial proceedings.
Indeed, Chief Justice Burger alone in his concurring opinion addressed the temporal question.2
Noting that the Sixth Amendment specifically speaks
to "trial", Burger drew a distinction between a
pre-trial proceeding, such as a suppression hearing, and the actual trial itself and concluded that
the presumptions are different for each.

Pre-trial

activities have traditionally been private and not
considered part of the trial unless and until the
results are actually offered as evidence.J
Whatever the reasons for the lack of clarity by
the Court in the matter of temporal applicability,
the resultant confusion moved four Justices to
speak publicly on the matter.4

Burger recapitulated

his view that the opinion in Gannett applied to pretrial proceedings only.

Blackmun, although opposed

to the decision, was convinced that the ruling would
allow closure of full trials as well as pre-trial proceedings.

Powell and Stevens, respectively, expressed

2Gannett, PP• 2913-2914.
3 Gann~tt, P• 2914

4 Bill Winter, p. 947.
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misgivings about the failure of the Court to address First Amendment grounds and the need for
new court rules or perhaps legislation to deal
with trial closure,5

Nonetheless, perplexity

reigned as witnessed by various news accounts and
commentaries6 and by the number of motions for
closure in the lower courts.?
Seven days following the Gannett ruling, the
Virginia Supreme Court upheld closure of a trial in
Virginia and on October 9, 1979, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear arguments
in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.

Many com-

mentators guessed that the Court would focus again
on the Sixth Amendment and provide some clarif ication as to its applicability to full trial proceedings in terms of a right of access,8

Instead, in

its opinion handed down on July 2, 1980, the Court
went directly to the conclusion that the First and
5o,G. Stephenson, p. 64.
6see Goodale, .. Gannett Means What It.Says, But
Who Knows What It Says? .. Nat'l L.J. (October
15, 1979), and Stephenson, "Rights in Continuing
Conflict •• ~." .
?winter,

p. 947,

Bsee Steph~n M. Kelley, "Members of the Public
and Press Have No Sixth Amendment Wight to Attend Pre-Trial Criminal Proceedings," U11Detroit
J, Urb. L. 57: 547-87 (Spring 1980), P• 579,
and Jonathan Howden, "Freedom of Expression and
the Media, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale," Hastings
.Const. L.Q. 71 338-352 (Winter 1980), p. 351.
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Fourteenth Amendments guaranteed a right of access of
press and public to crimin~l trials.9 Justice White,
in a brief concurring opinion, noted that the case and
indeed the First Amendment question would have been
unnecessary had the Court followed the lead of the
four Gannett dissenters in finding a Sixth Amendment
presumptive prohibition against closure. 10

He did not

admit that the Court might reasonably have addressed
the First Amendment question in its Gannett ruling.
The other Justices failed to comment on the matter
except for Blackmun who complimented the Court on its
reliance on legal history in making its determination.
He also expressed his gratification in seeing "the
Court wash away at least some of the grafitti that
marred the prevailing opinions in Gannett."

He re-

proved Burger (who wrote the opinion in the Richmond
case) for making the distinction between pre-trial
proceedings and the trial itself in his Gannett concurrence and yet joining the Court's judgment and
thereby contributing to the resultant confusion.11
9rn his concurring opinion (Richmond,· p. 2840),
Justice Stewart specifically extended the guarantee to' include civil trials as well. There
was a suggestion in the Gannett case that civil
proceedings were included. Both Justice Blackmun
and Justice Rehnquist cite two cases involving
civil actions,· Nixon v. Warner Communications 98
s.ct. 1306 (1978) and Pell v. Produnier 98 s.ct.
2800 (1975). See Kelley, P• 554.
10Gannett, P• 2830.
11 Gannett, P• 2841.
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Blackmun reiterated his position that the Gannett
decision was erroneous in its interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment and in its application to pre-trial
suppression hearings,12
Otherwise, the Court failed to address the question of access to pre-trial proceedings based upon
First Amendment grounds.

That question remains open,

presumably awaiting another case in which such argument might be made.
The distinction between pre-trial proceedings
and full trials has been discussed by commentators
and by the Court itself in dicta.

The Gannett case

was, in many ways, a "logical outgrowth"l3 of Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart. 14

In that case, the

Supreme Court struck down a gag order 15 restraining
publication by the press of information received in
a pre-trial hearing.

The gag order was deemed to be

12 Gannett, p. 2842.
lJKelley, P•

555.

14 96 s.ct. 2791 (1976).
1 5The use of "gag orders" by state and federal
courts grew out of the Supreme Court's decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell 86 S.Ct. 1507
(1966), The Court's ruling was widely interpreted by lower courts as supporting issuance
of such orders against the press, a construction which many commentators questioned. See
J.C. Landau, "Fair Trial and Free Press1 A
Due Process Proposal," ABAJ 621 55-64 (January
1976).
J2

prior restraint against which there exists a high
presumption of unconstitutionality16 which imposes
a heavy burden not overcome by the circumstances.
Chief Justice Burger noted that while "it can be
said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions
after publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint
'freezes' it at least for the time: 1 7
Though it prohibited restraint placed on the
press to publish information already in its possession, the Court in Nebraska did not address the
question of whether or not the trial judge could
prevent the press and the public from receiving information by issuing exclusionary or closure orders.
In fact, in a footnote, Burger alluded to existing
guidelines18 that recommended closing of pre-trial
proceedings, but he expressly refused to confront
that issue.19

By implication, several commentators

have noted, courts were left free to inhibit news
l6Nebraska, p. 2808. For case precedent supporting a presumption against prior restraint,
see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson 51 s. Ct.
625 (1931); Organization for a B~tter Austin
v. Keefe 91 s. Ct. 1575 (1971); and New York
Times Co. v~ u.s. 91 s.ct. 2140 (1971).
1 7Nebraska, p. 280).
18 American Bar Assoc. Project on Standards for
Criminal Justice, Fair Trial and Free Press
2-15 (App. Draft 1968).
1 9Nebtaska, p. 2805.
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gathering at its source.20

Thus, after Nebraska

the main point of emphasis in the free press/fair
trial controversy moved from prior restraints to
exclusionary orders with commentators expressing
differing views as to the constitutionality of
those orders.21

Courts began to resort to restrict-

ing access to pre-trial hearings and sealing documents and records of such hearings from the public.22
What is the material difference between pretrial and trial proceedings that has led to such
confusion in the Court's stand?

In Gannett, Burger

asserted that the stuff of modern pre-trial proceedings--such as the exclusionary rule and pre-trial
motions to suppress evidence--were unheard of at the
20 see M.J. Zavatsky, "Rights in Collision:
Deciding Cases in the Free Press/Fair Trial
Debate," U. Cinn. L.R. 49: 440-61 (1980);
Landau, "Free Press Boon ••• "1 "Free Press Fair Trial Dilemmaz New Dimensions in a
Continuing Struggle," Hofstra L.R. 6:1013-40
(Summer 1978).
21 see "The Wight to Attend Criminal Hearings,"
Columbia L.R. 78:1308-1321 (1978); "Clos~re
Orders: Safeguard of Fair Trial or Prior
Restraint?", Fordham Urban J.L. 7:163-90
(1978-79)s "New Dimensions ••• ," Hofstra.
22 Paul Britton, "The Right to Attend Pre-trial
Criminal Proceedings: Free Press, Public Trial
and Priorities in Curbing Pre-Trial Publicity,"
Syracuse L.R. 28(4): 875-921.
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time of the framing of the Constitution.23

Stewart

said that no right of the public to attend pre-trial
hearings existed in English common law, that the purpose of pre-trial hearings was to prevent contaminated
information from reaching the jury and thus infringing on fair trial.

Suppression hearings, although

unknown in early times, rationally served the same
purpose.24
There is a great deal of commentative literature?5 however, to refute this viewpoint and Justice
Blackmun's partial dissent joins that view.26

Indeed,

an opinion out of the Third Circuit in 197327 upheld
the view that pre-trial suppression hearings fall
within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a public
tria1.28

According to this argument, pre-trial hear-

ings are so similar to trials and so often determinative
23Gannett, p. 2913.
24Gannett, footnote, p. 2910.
2 5see "Right to Attend ••• " Columbia, as an example.
26 Gannett, P• 3933.
2 7u.s. v. Cianfrani, 573 F 2d 835, 849-51 (1978
CA 3 Pa). Al~o note U.S. v. Lopez 328 F. Supp.
1077, 1987 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)1 "This right to a
public trial attaches at the suppression hearing - often the crucial stage."
28 one judge rejected Sixth Amendment grounds in
favor of First Amendment grounds.
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of the outcome of litigation, 2 9that any constitutional right of access would be applicable.

Blackmun

thought this particularly true of suppression hearings.

He wrote that, "unlike any other proceeding

apart from the trial itself, the suppression hearing
implicates all the polieies that require that the trial
be public."30 He went on to argue that pre-trial hearings, and suppression hearings in particular, are so
important to the system of justice as to be considered
''part of the trial."3 1 In fact, the suppression hearing may be the only proceeding held and may be the point
in the total procedure where misconduct by police and
other parties may be most in evidence.

In addition,

the most relevant evidence might be suppressed without
public scrutiny if the procedure is closed.3 2 He went
on to deny that the interest of the public is protected
by the prosecutor, judge, or other parties, given the
possibility of connivance among them.

Closure of these

proceedings would undermine the confidence of the public and the appearance of justice.33 Therefore, the
2 9It is in pre-trial hearings that decisions are
made in regard to incarceration pending trialor
the setting of bond for bail. Also, plea bargaining arrangements are made in this phase which can
result in the dropping of charges or the incarceration of defendants on arranged guilty pleas.
30Gannett, p. 2934.
3 1Gannett, P• 2935.
3 2Gannett, pl 2934.
J3Gannett, p. 2935.
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same values which would require public trials
would extend to pre-trial suppression hearings
as well, according to this argument.
Those who would argue for closure of pre-trial
suppression hearings follow the reasoning offered
by Justice Stewart in Gannett when he posed the
problem of publicity at this stage as being "particularly acute."

While prejudicial information

can, by various means, be.kept from jurors at full
trial, it may be impossible to shield jurors from
such information that has been publicized via a
pre-trial hearing.

Thus, Justice Stewart argues,

fair trial may be jeopardized and closure is often
"one of the most effective methods that a trial
judge can employ ••• " 34
But Blackmun gave significant weight to the
importance of suppression hearings as distinguishable from other pre-trial proceedings, such as preliminary hearings, to determine probable cause for
binding a defendant for trial, grand jury procedures,
coroner's inquests, and others.

These, he contended,

are not critical to the system and thus the Court's
reliance on statutory law and precedent and legal history dealing with these latter procedures do not serve
to support private suppression hearings with which

34aannett, p. 2910.

See also Burger's concurrence
in Gannett, p. 2914.

37

they do not deal.

He further contended that where

there is no pre-trial suppression hearing (and there
is no federal regulation that states conduct such
hearings), objections to evidence are made after presentation in "open court" and thus the temporal factor should not be used as a standard for justifying
closure on grounds of protecting jurors from inadmissable or contaminated evidence.35
But Blackmun, as well as the other members of
the Court, recognized that there are few absolutes in
the matter of seemingly conflicting rights, and all
recognize the importance of insuring to the defendant
a fair trial.

Despite the strong presumption in favor

of open proceedings (whether found in the First or
the Sixth Amendment and whether applicable at pretrial or trial stages), courts have recognized exceptions, limitations, and restrictions even when the
accused has objected to such exclusions.
For example, the Supreme Court and other federal
courts have held that a requirement of public trial
does not include all of the public or even all segments of the public.

In Sheppard v. Maxwel1,J6 the

court allowed restrictions on newsgathering techniques,
35Gannett, p. 2935.
36see note

15 supra~
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In Estes v. Texasi7 the Court restricted the use of
electronic media.JS

Again, in Nixon v. Warner

Communications, Inc.~9 the Court held that there is
no requirement that tapes admitted into evidence be
released to the general public.

There is, therefore,

no recognizable right for unlimited public access to
all that occurs at a trial.40
In addition, as noted in the Gannett opinion, exclusion has been upheld to avoid embarrassment to witnesses, to protect spectators from obscene or offensive
testimony and to maintain order and decorum.41

Courts

have also allowed exclusion to avoid prejudice to the
J7s5 s.ct. 1628 (1965). ,
3 8on January 26, 1981, in Chandler v. Florida
(49 LW 4142), the Supreme Court refused to
declare unconstitutional a Florida court rule
permitting the presence of broadcast media (radio
and TV) in the courtroom absent a definitive
showing by the defendant of a specific due process violation. In so doing, the Court rejected
a contention that its Estes ruling had established a per ~ constitutional rule barring
broadcast coverage of courtroom activities.
The narrow ruling was that the Court would not
interfere with Florida practices "absent a
showing of prejudice oi constitutional dimensions." (p. 4147).
39see note 9 supra.
40see U.S. v. Rios Ruiz (1979, CA1Puerto Rico)
579 F 2d 670r U.S. ex rel. Orlando v. Fay
(1965, CA2 NY) 350 P-2d 967, cert den 384 US
1008, 16 L Ed 2d 1021, 86 s.ct. 19611 U.S. v.
Juarez (1978, CA5 Tex) 573 F 2d 267, reh den
(CA5 Tex) 577 F 2d 1134 and cert den 439 US
915, 58 L Ed 2d 262, 99 s.ct. 289.
41 Gannett, p. 2910.
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state~2 to prevent overcrowding~3 to preserve confidentiali ty~4 to prevent the intimidation of wit-

nesses~5 and to protect national security concerns.46
In both the Gannett and Richmond decisions, various
justices gave recognition to reasonable restrictions
and limitations imposed by trial judges for the convenience of the court and the protection of certain
considerations not necessarily of a constitutional
nature,47 There is no dicta in either Gannett or
Richmond to indicate a change in limitations of this
nature on public access to the courtroom.
Given that neither a recognizable Sixth Amendment
guarantee nor a recognizable First Amendment guarantee of a public trial is absoiute to either the defendant on the one hand or to the press and public on the
other, what constitutes grounds in the eyes of the
Supreme Court for closure to insure a fair trial?

And

given the establishment of identifiable grounus, what
procedures must a trial judge follow in order to close
proceedings to the public?
4 2u.s. ex rel. Laws v. Yeager (1971, CA3 NJ) 448
F 2d ~,-cert den 405 U.S. 976, 31 L Ed 2d 251,
92 s.ct. 1201.·

43u.s. v. ~obli (1949, CA3 Pa) 172

F 2d 917.

44u.s. v. Bell (1972, CA 2 NY) 464 F 2d 667, cert
den 409 u.s. 991, 34 L Ed 2d 258, 93 s.ct. 335.
4 5Perez v. Metz (1977, SD NY) 459 F Supp 1131.
46 u.s. v. Nixon 94 s.ct. 3090.
4 7Richmond, p. 2840.
40

There is no dispute that the trial judge is
responsible for the conduct of the trial and for
the protection of the interests of the defendant
and public alike in the fair administration of justice within the framework of Constitutional guarantees.48

In carrying out this responsibility, the

trial judge must not only rely on interpretations
of Court rulings on the broad questions but must
also look to the Court and case precedent for guidance in applying those rulings in specific cases.
In Gannett, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice
Stevens, would allow closure on the consent of the
prosecutor and defendant.
that

a~y

There is no indication

consideration of circumstances or mitigat-

ing factors is necessary.

Rehnquist, who took the

hardest line, specifically stated that the participants may cause closure "for any reason" whatsoever,
for the Justice is absolutist in finding no right of
access for the press and public.49

Chief Justice

Burger, alone, in restricting application to pretrial situations, offered

no tests or standards for

closure beyond the defendant's request.50

48see Shepherd and Nebraska.
49Gannett, P• 2918,
5°aannett, pp. 2913-14.
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The dissenting group (Blackmun, White, Brennan
and Marshall), which found a right of access in the
Sixth Amendment, was naturally more circumspect and
placed the burden of proof on the defendant to
establish that closure is "strictly and inescapably
necessary" for a fair tria1.5 1

Deigning to lay down

an absolute standard, Blackmun suggested a minimum
showing by the defendant of {1) concrete and specific
evidence of "substantial probability of irreparable
damage," ( 2) evidence of "substantial probability"
that measures other than closure are inadequate for
protection of fair trial rights, and (J) evidence of
positive, "substantial probability" that closure will
work.52

Blackmun went on to caution that high levels

of publicity do not necessarily or automatically work
to the detriment of a defendant's rights to a fair
trial.

In fact, he refers to the Nebraska decision

in noting that instances of reversals on those grounds
are "relatively rare" and that the harm feared is usually highly speculative.53 If the defendant is able
to show the above and the trial judge orders exclusion,
such exclusion orders should extend only to the narrowest limits necessary and should be temporary.

Ac-

curate records for future scrutiny are essential.

As

51Gannett, p. 2936.
52Gannett, p. 2937.
53Gannett, p. 29J8, Nebraska, p. 2800.
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to the due process rights of those subject to exclusion, Blackmun would not require an evidentiary
hearing, nor would he require that the public be
given advance notice of the exclusion.

He would,

rather, give those directly subject to exclusion
opportunity to voice objections in court prior to
the order taking effect and would require the court
to place its reasons for closure in the trial record.
The press would enjoy no special due process rights
apart from the public at large.54 Blackmun indicated
that he would not erect a standard here as strict as
he might advocate in the instance of a First Amendment
question, rejecting the assertion that closure is comparable to prior restraint.

In fact, as noted in

Chapter 1, he specifically refused to address the issue of access on First Amendment grounds in this case.55
Justice Powell in addressing First Amendment considerations in his Gannett opinion did not see the
necessity of as strict a standard as would be required
in a prior restraint situation such as Nebraska.

He

even found the Blackmun standard too inflexible even
to permit exclusion-where necessary for fair tria1.56

54Gannett, P• 2939.
55Gannett, p. 2940.

56Gannett, P• 2915.
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Rather, he would advocate a balancing of First and
Fifth Amendment considerations in which no rights
were subordinated to others.

While rejecting the

stricter standard, Powellfound some relevance to
this case in the Nebraska situation where the Court
proposes that the trial judge must consider alternative means of protection, hear objections of those
actually present and subject to exclusion, and place
the burden on the defendant (and on the State if it
joins in the request for closure) to show the necessity for it.

The public and the press have responsi-

bility for putting forth viable alternative means
which would serve to mitigate any harm to fair tria1.57
In the instant case, Powell found that the trial judge
had acted appropriately and thus he concurred in the
judgment.
The alternative to closure alluded to in various
opinions, though not discussed in detail, are those
enumerated at length in both Sheppard v. Maxwell and
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.

They include

voir dire, jury sequestration, jury instruction,
continuance, severance, change of venire, change of
venue, sealing of the transcript, and control of
courtroom atmosphere and decorum.

The adequacy of

these measures to insure a fair trial in the presence
57Gannett, p. 2916.
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of press and public attention is uncertain in the
minds of some of the justices, particularly those
five in the Gannett majority who would allow unrestricted closure by agreement of trial participants.
Their decision in the Richmond case would indicate
greater faith in those measures.
But in the Richmond case, the circumstances differ.

Here the Court by 7-1 ruling (Powell did not

participate), found a definitive right of access to
full trials in the First Amendment.

Great lip serv-

ice is given to the importance of First Amendment
rights and their structural role in the American system of government in general and the administration
of justice in particular.

By implication, the opinion

of the Court and the concurring opinions filed recognized that such rights were not absolute and one
might expect some delineation of a standard of exception.

But as Blackmun pointed out in his concurrence,

such was not the case.
Chief Justice Burger found fault with the trial
judge's closure decision in that it failed to provide
reasons for closure and made no inquiry as to alternative measures available short of closure.

Burger used

the term "overriding interest" to describe circumstances which might warrant closure,58
58Richmond, p. 2829-30.
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He did not

define his meaning.

Justice Stevens also could find

no record of justification, implying that such a
record might present acceptable reasons for closure.
Again, there was no definition of what might be
justifiable.59
Justice White would, apparently, allow exclusion
under "narrowly defined citcumstances."60 Justices
Brennan and Marshall mention "countervailing interests"
which might tip the balance away from a First Amendment presumption of openness, but did not in this case
define those interests and how they might be protected.
These Justices were troubled that the state had provided the judge with "unfettered discretion'' in ordering closure,6 1

Justice Stewart spoke of "reasonable

limitations upon the unrestricted occupation of a
courtroom" and alluded to alternatives available in
trial situations.6 2
59Richmond, beginning at p. 28JO. Following the
Gannett decision, one commentator (Goodale,
note 6 supra) speculated that Stevens might
ultimately favor a Blackmun standard if the
Court ever recognized a right of public access
to full trials. His reasoning was based on
the fact that Stevens had ~oted for access in
previous cases. Indeed, Stevens referred to
those cases in his Richmond concurrence but
failed to endorse any particular standard.
60Richmond, p. 28JO,
61 Richmond, p. 2839.
62 Richmond, p. 2840.
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Blackmun, who had suggested a fairly strict
test in his Gannett dissent, found the standards
suggested in both these cases to be "troublesome"
and marked by "uncertainty" as to their nature and
strictness.

He agreed with his colleagues that the

trial judge in this case had abridged the public's
First Amendment interests but obviously had some
concern for trial judges in future cases faced with
the task of balancing competing rights and interests.63
6 JRichmond, p. 2842.
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III. CONVERGENCE OF PRECEDENT IN
ANALYZING A RIGHT OF ACCESS
An analysis of the rulings of the Supreme
Court in the Gannett and Richmond decisions and
their legal impact in regard to a right of access
of the public to judicial proceedings necessitates
an examination of the precedential bases of those
decisions.

On the surface, these cases would appear

to attach to the long line of cases dealing with what
has been commonly referred to as the "fair trialfree press controversy",

Ho~ever,

of equal import-

ance are those cases in which the Court has dealt
with the question of access to governmental infermation and institutions.

Indeed, there is a convergence

of these two lines of precedent employing several threads
of constitutional thought.1
Fair Trial - Free Press Precedent
The fair trial - free press controversy represents
a confrontation of two compelling constitutional guarantees represented by the First and Sixth Amendments.
Few clashes of interest have been more resistant to
1Robert F. Copple, "Public Trials and a First
Amendment Right of Access: A Presumption of
Openness," Nebraska L.R. 60: 169-199 (1981).

48

solution since both seem to occupy preferred positions in the Constitution,2 The controversy is
generally centered around the effects of publicity
on a defendant's right to a fair trial.

Such pub-

licity may adhere prior to trial thus prejudicing
the jury pool or it may involve publicity and the
methods of newsgathering during trial which may
prejudice the ability of the defendant to secure
a fair trial.

When adversarial conflicts have arisen

between these two compelling interests of free and
open discussion of public issues on the one hand and
justice in the courtroom on the other, the Supreme
Court has had to balance the two and, in doing so,
attempt to define a state of law capable of resolving
such conflicts.
The controversy has a long and involved history.
Early cases centered on the use of the contempt power
to control the activities of the news media
the criminal justice system.

vis-a~vis

Over the years, the

Court gradually refined the doctrine of contempt by
publication until, by mid-century, a trial court's
power to use contempt against the press had been so
contracted as to be useful only in controlling disorder
2u.s. v. Carolene Products Co. 304 U.S. 144
(1938).

in the courtroom and in areas immediately adjacent
thereto.J
The next line of defense in the Court's arsenal
against prejudicial publicity was the tack of reversing convictions on due process grounds.4

Reversals

were based on the statement of Justice Jackson in
the Shepherd case that "newspapers in the enjoyment
of their constitutional rights, may not deprive accused persons of their right to a fair trial.

The

convictions ••• do not meet any civilized conception
of due process of law.

That alone is sufficient •.•

to warrant rev~rsal. 11 5

Two notorious cases, Estes v.

Texas6 and Sheppard v. Maxwell?, involved reversals

of highly celebrated criminal convictions, the latter
exemplifying the worst and most flagrant documented
3principal 20th century cases dealing with the
contempt power are Toledo Newspaper co. v. U.S.
247 U.S. 402 (1917); Bridges v. California 314
U.S. 252 {1941); Times Mirror Co. v. Superior
Court 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida
328 U.S. 331 (1946); Craig v. Harney 331 U.S.
367 (1947); Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show
333 u.s. 912 (1950).
4 see Shepherd v. Florida 343 U.S. 181 (1951);
Marshall v. U.S. J60 U.S. 310 (1959); Irwin v.
Dowd 366 U.S. 717 (1961); and Rideau v.
Louisiana 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
5Alfred Friendly and Ronald L. Goldfarb, Crime
and Publicity (New York1 The Twentieth Century
Fund, 1967), P• JOO.
6 85 s.ct. 1628 (1965).
786 s.ct. 1507, 384 u.s. 333 (1966).
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abuse on the part of the judiciary, the press, and
law enforcement of the fair administration of justice.

The Sheppard case represents the most definitive

statement by the Supreme Court in regard to press interference with due process.
In Sheppard, the Court attempted to provide guidance to trial court judges (who were finding themselves
subject to reversal if they improperly balanced First
and Sixth Amendment interests) in determining how to
protect fair trial rights in the face of prejudicial
publicity.

In its decision, as previously noted,8

the Court listed those procedural safeguards available
to the trial court while noting that "reversals are
but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial
measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception."9

The Court's suggestions reaffirmed the

trial judge's power to control the courtroom and
provided precedent for affirmative judicial actions
to protect the integrity of fair trial.lo

Signifi-

cantly, the Court went beyond in-court measures and
recommended that the trial judge control the release
8see Chapter II.
9sheppard, 384

u.s.,

363.

10sheldon Portman, "The Defense of Fair Trial
from Sheppard to Nebraska Press Assoc: Benign
Neglect to Affirmative Action and Beyond,"
Stanford L.R. 29(3): 393-410 (February 1977),
P• 405.
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of information to the press by witnesses, counsel,
and police, specifically recommending prohibitions
against "extrajudicial statements by any lawyer,
party, witness, or court official which divulged
prejudical matters ..... 11
The impact of the Sheppard decision was to revive the use of the comtempt power to control the
effect of prejudicial publicity.

Following the deci-

sion, there was a proliferation of silence or gag
orders. 12

But in addition to issuing gag orders

against parties, lawyers and witnesses, courts began issuing gag orders directly against the press
itself.

That such direct orders were mandated by

the Sheppard decision is highly questionable but
such orders were being used, citing Sheppard as
precedent.
The issuance of a direct gag order against the
press was the issue in the Nebraska case,13 the next
major case in the modern interface of First and Sixth
Amendment rights and the first head-on confrontation
between the two,

In holding the order invalid as an

unconstitutional use of "prior restraint," the Court
11 sheppard, 384 U.S., 361.
12 The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
Washington, D.C., cited some 173 cases by 1975.
Censorship Newsletter VIII (October - November
197 5).
1 396 s.ct. 2791 (1976).
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leaned away from concerns about due process and an increasingly powerful press toward a concern for First
Amendment values.

In this case, the Court employed

a traditional balancing doctrine, rejecting absolute
rules against prior restraints.
While the decision to overturn was unanimous,
there was disagreement among the Justices as to justification and as to grounds.

An analysis of this

opinion and some speculation on the Court's decisionmaking process are instructive.
The Court's opinion, authored by Chief Justice
Burger, refused to place an absolute ban on prior
restraints in judicial contexts.

Justice Brennan,

as evidenced by his concurring opinion in which
Justices Marshall and Stewart joined, wanted just
such an absolute ban on all gag orders.

Justices

White and Stevens joined with Burger but, in their
separate concurring opinions, both indicated that
they were leaning toward the Brennan position by expressing doubts that an instance justifying prior
restraint orders would ever exist.

(There is evi-

dence that there was a behind-the-scenes confrontation
over the assignment of the opinion and that the
Brennan concurrence was originally written as the
opinion of the Court. 1 4) Despite its reluctance to
14

See Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The
Brethren (New York: Simon and Schuster:--I°979).
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completely ban such orders, the Court did place an
extremely high barrier against them, requiring the
strictest scrutiny and presumption of invalidness.
Some commentators, nonetheless, have expressed
discomfiture at the Court's refusal to establish an
absolute ban and its continued use of a case-by-case
balancing technique.

The door was left open, accord-

ing to some, for a future restriction on newsgathering
activities.15

The Court would appear to be restating

its rejection of the Black-Douglas absolutist position that the First Amendment means what it says
without exception, a position which has enjoyed no
support on this Court. 1 6

Despite this, the Court has

upheld First Amendment absolutes in such cases as
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn 17 and in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.18

An absolute ban on press

1 5see, e.g., M.J. Zavatsky, "Rights in Collisions
Deciding Cases in the Free Press/Fair Trial
Debate," U.Cinn. L.R. 49:440-461 (1980);
Robert D. Sack, "Principle and Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart," Stanford L.R. 29(3)s
411-430 (February 1977),
16sack, p. 413 citing A. Bickel, The Morality of
Consent (1975) and H. Black, A Constitutional
Faith 45 (1968).

u.s:

1 7420
469 (1975), (absolute ban against
restrictions on publishing information from
public court records).
18 418 U.S. 241 (1974), (absolute right for publishers to choose to refrain from publishing
political replies).
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gag orders would have provided predictability and
security; failure to do so may result in trial
judges attempting to employ them, resulting in costly
and time consuming appellate procedures.19
However, it is difficult to see how such orders
could pass the test established by the Nebraska opinion given Chief Justice Burger's stringent standards
for allowing them.

Standards prerequisite to an

order would require that ·(1) pre-trial publicity is
likely to reach the jurors, (2) alternative measures
would not succeed and (3) a gag order would succeed
in mitigating adverse publicity.

In all likelihood,

these requirements would be impossible to meet and
the Court may, given the dicta in the concurring
opinions, one day establish a per se ban on prior
restraints in all but national security ~ases,20
The recognition of a categorical right of the
press to report what occurs in open court left open
the question of whether a court could simply close
proceedings and, thus, limit access to the information.
1 9sack, p. 414. See also James c. Goodale, "The
Press Ungagge.ds The Practical Effect on Gag
Order Litigation of Nebraska Press Assoc. v.
Stuart,~ Stanford L.R. 29(3)s 497-513
(Febnrlary 1977).
20while placing severe limitations on direct
prior restraint orders against the press, the
Court has left intact the use of silence orders against trial participants as sources of
information.
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The only significant case, prior to 1979, in which
the Court had dealt with a secret judicial proceeding was In ~ Oliver 21 in which the defendant had
charged a violation of his due process righti. The
Court had never had to rule on closed judicial proceedings in which the defendant had acquiesced in the
closure and in which the judge had issued a direct
order for closure.

The Nebraska decision precipitated

the issue by leaving the door open for trial judges
to employ such a technique in attempting to insure
fair trial in the face of active media interest.
Right of Access Precedent
The existence of a right of access has been discussed by the Court in several theoretical contexts
prior to the Gannett and Richmond cases.

Most basic-

ally, the Court has consistently recognized that the
First Amendment protects a right of expression.22
Concomitantly, it has recognized a right to receive
information available to it and to transmit a message.23
2 168 s.ct. 499 (1948).
22 see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 276 U.S.
354, (1964) 283, that the "general proposition
that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has
long been settled by our decisions."
23see, e.g., Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council 425 u.s. 748 (1976);
Stanley v. Georgia 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Fed. Communications
Comm. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).

The cases at issue would add another context to the
mix with an assertion of an affirmative right to
gather information.
The most significant line of access precedent
affecting Gannett and Richmond began in 1965 with
1

Zemel v. Rusk in which the Court rejected a First
Amendment argument and held that "the right to speak
and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained
right to gather information. 24 This idea was expanded
11

in Branzburg v. Hayes when the Court refused a reporter's claim to protection of confidential sources
by advancing the principle that the press and public
are equal in that "the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access
to information not available to the public generally. 25
11

But, the Court also said, somewhat contradictorily,
that "newsgathering is not without its First Amendment
protections ...... 26

While the Branzburg case was spe-

cifically directed to the issue of reporter's privilege
rather than to the question of a public right of access
to the institutions and processes of government, it
clearly added to the debate over the existence of such
24 381 U.S. 1 (1965), 16.
2 5408 U.S. 665 (1972), 684.
26 Branzburg, P• 707.
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a right.27
In two related cases, Pell v. Procunier28 and
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.?9 the issue of a First
Amendment right of access emerged again.

Both dealt

specifically with access to prisoners and prison facilities and in both holdings the Court denied special
press access, reasoning that restrictions placed on
the press did not inhibit the press
public institutions.

f~om

scrutinizing

The Court re-emphasized its

Branzburg statement that the press was entitled to no
special privilege not available to the public at large,
but in Pell the Court again noted that newsgathering
had First Amendment protections.JO
Then, in a case factually similar to the above,
Houchins v. KQED, Inc.~ 1 the Court was faced with a
claim that a First Amendment right of access had been
abridged.

In denying the claim, the Court appeared

to be following its Pell and Saxbe holdings, but the
decision was far from clear.
27 Copple, p. 180.
28 417

u.s.

817 (1974).

2 9417 U.S. R43 (1974).
3°copple, p. 181-182.

3 1 438

u.s.

1 (1978)
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Only three Justices

found no First Amendment right to Government-controlled
information or sources (Burger, White and Rehnquist).
Stewart concurred on the narrow ground of the Pell and
Saxbe refusal to give the press special privileges
over the public, though he noted that practical distinctions might exist.32

The dissenters--Stevens,

Powell and Brennan--noted that Pell and Sax.be had
dealt with facilities where some access was already
allowed, whereas Houchins presented an unfounded, arbitrary policy of concealment.

Since Blackmun and

Marshall did not participate, the significance of the
Court's decision is problematic and the Court's position on a definitive right of access was unclear.
Analysis
As noted above, the Gannett case offerred the
Court the opportunity to address the question of access in a fair trial - free press context.

In its

decision, the Court refused to recognize a right of
access to judicial proceedings in the Sixth Amendment,
reserving the First Amendment question for the Richmond
case in which the Court recognized a First Amendment
right of access to criminal trials.

A close scrutiny

of that decision, in light of the precedential bases
noted above, reveals that the Richmond case does not
fit perfectly or neatly into either line of precedent.
The closure of a court proceeding was neither specifically

32Houchins, p. 16.
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prescribed by Sheppard nor specifically proscribed
by Nebraska.

Like Nebraska, the Richmond decision

did rest on a First Amendment issue and prior restraints and court closures are somewhat analogous.
Certainly the effects are the same since both are
~·parte

orders preventing or postponing publica-

tion.33 The press has argued that they are equivalent in that a closure order is indirect prior
restraint and ought to be· outlawed on the same basis.

But there are fundamental differences between

the two which such an argument misses.

For one, gag

orders are direct interference with the exercise of
free expression and are prohibited because they directly prevent the publicatiori of :information already
obtained.

Closure orders prevent publication by pre-

venting access.

The difference here is more to method

than to effect, but the scope is also different in
that a prior restraint is variable and broader whereas
closure is limited to a specific proceeding and a
specific source.

In addition, the press, under a gag

order, could choose to violate the order and proceed
to release information to the public.

No such option

exists where proceedings are closed plus the general
public has no opportunity to scrutinize.

The Nebraska

case, therefore, recognized a press right to transmit
33copple, p. 187.
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information but not to gather it.

The Richmond

case was clearly not an extension of Nebraska but
was instead a case breaking new ground.34
Therefore, the Court correctly characterized the
case as one of access but was immediately confronted
with its Gannett holding.

Gannett had been cited by

the Virginia Supreme Court in its upholding of closure; therefore, in order to recognize a right of
access, the Court either ·had to overrule Gannett or
restrict its applicability.

It chose the latter

course, allowing the Sixth Amendment analysis of no
general right of access to stand and restricting the
Gannett holding to pre-trial proceedings.
The Court then had to confront its previous treatment of a right of access in the First Amendment, particularly its refusal in Houchins to recognize a per
se right of access to sources of information under
government control.

Court proceedings certainly fell

within that framework.

Clearly, from the dicta, the

Court wanted to open trials to the public but was
apparently reluctant to lift all restrictions on access across the board.

It either had to overrule the

entire package of access cases or find a way to limit
a right of access specifically to opening trials and
to do so in a way that was congruent with previous
rulings.

34see generally, "New Dimensions in a Continuing
Struggle," Sack, pp. 427-428; Copple, pp. 187-188.
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The Court chose the latter option although how
well it did so is problematic.

One commentator sees

no incongruence between the access cases and the
Richmond issue, noting that in the previous cases
the Court had not only never denied a right of access
but also had never directly addressed the issue.35
Both Burger and Brennan, in their divergent approaches
to finding a source, sought to reconcile the finding
of a right of access with the previous cases.

Justice

Stevens, as noted supra and infra, found such efforts
troublesome and largely unsuccessful.
Neither Burger nor Brennan received support from
a majority of the Court for their two distinct theeries in support of a right of access to the courtroom.
Again, the Burger Court had handed down a decision
in which the reasoning was cloudy and the impact
uncertain.
The Chief Justice found support in an analysis
of Anglo-American history, in the speech and press
clauses and the right of assembly clause of the First
Amendment, and in the Ninth Amendment.

His histori-

cal analysis was a general statement of policy.

His

constitutional analysis rested on the First Amendment
which he interprets as establishing a penumbra right
of access based on the functional role played by
35craig H. Lubben, "Right of Access to Criminal
Trials," Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology
711 547-557 (Winter 1980), p. 553.
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the speech, press and assembly clauses in the process
of self-government.

He extended the First Amendment

protections for speakers and writers to include the
right to listen by those receiving information.
Burger attempted to reconcile Richmond with Pell,
Saxbe and Houchins (and in so doing justified the
limitations he placed on the reach of his judgment)
by distinguishing the previous cases as dealing with
institutions not characterized by a tradition of
openness as contrasted to courts which are so characterized.

This points to at least one difficulty with

any employment of an historical analysis, for such an
analysis does not allow for historical deviation from
constitutional norms or ideals.
Burger encountered other difficulties.

One com-

mentator has scored the opinion as being technically
flawed in that the cases cited to support his conten. tion of a right of access based on the speech, press
and assembly clauses were misinterpreted,36

The

Chief Justice, in attempting to narrow his holding to
criminal trials, also encountered some analytical difficulties and

produc~d

some inconsistent reasoning.

He centered his' analysis on the "therapeutic" value
to society of scrutinizing the operation of the criminal justice system and on the "cathartic" value of the
criminal trial in serving

a

J6 Lubben, P• 554.
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function to society.

He

thus announced the discovery of a new penumbral
First Amendment

right to protect these values.

Therefore, he appeared to be promoting a theory
that access is protected by the First Amendment
where a tradition of openness exists because such
openness promotes efficiency of governmental operation.

Indeed, the Chief Justice offered: an interest-

ing twist to First Amendment theory, one which sees
the First Amendment as intending to promote good,
efficient government rather than promoting the personal liberties of the people.37
Burger's Ninth Amendment analysis also suffers.
The premise is a valid one, the Ninth Amendment having received a dearth of attention in the analysis
of rights, but he failed to develop it logically.
The point is that the Court has acknowledged that
certain rights are implicit in enumerated rights
and are, in fact, peripherally necessary to the full
enjoyment and security of these specific rights.JS
The problem is that, while he insisted that a right
to attend criminal trials enhances the freedom of
press and speech, he failed to show why making a
transcript available would not serve the same purpose,
J?"The Supreme Court, 1979 term: Freedom of
Speech, Press, and Association," Harvard L.R.
941 149-159 (November 1980).
3 8see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticutt 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
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given his acknowledgement that people do not generally attend trials but rely on newspaper accounts
for information.39 (Brennan could have incorporated
the Ninth Amendment into his structural model more
successfully.)
Justice Brennan's opinion differed from that of
the Chief Justice on several significant points.

In

the first place, Brennan denied the discovery of a new
constitutional right, as·serting that the right always existed, but that the Court had simply never
had opportunity to address it affirmatively.

The

problem here results from divergent approaches in
dealing with the precedential right of access cases.
Brennan interpreted them as holding out some restrictions on a right of access; Burger remembered his own
flat denial of such a right in Houchins, forgetting
that he was not supported by a majority of the Court.4°
Whoever is right, the Court is likely to be plagued
in the future by these earlier cases.
Another major point of divergence is the source
of a right of access.
conglomeration of

F~rst

Instead of finding it in a
Amendment protections of the

rights of discussion, Brennan found an independent
basis in the structural role played by the First
Amendment.

This model links the rights of communication

39Lubben, p.

~

55~.

40 s ee St evens opinion
' '
. th e R'ic hmon d case,
in
PP• 2830-2831.
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to the process of self-government, thus extending
protection to whatever promotes full debate and
discussion of governmental operations.

Government

is required, therefore, to open the courtroom to the
scrutiny of the public.

In line with his interpre-

tation of the access precedents, Brennan was reluctant
to make a right of access either unrestricted or unconditional and proposed a two-tiered test to determine where a right of access exists.

The first tier

was based on the historical question of whether or
not a tradition of openness for a particular governmental institution or process exists, to which he
added the question of whether or not access was important to its function.

In the matter of criminal

trials, both tiers of the test were met.
On the surface, given the weight which each gives
to tradition plus the grounding in the First Amendment,
it would appear that Burger and Brennan have simply
arrived at the same point from two different philosophical directions.
are substantial.

In actuality, the differences

In the first place, Brennan's First

Amendment theory is more in line with the purposes of
the First Amendment since the l&.mendment was designed
not to protect the spectacle of what government does
so much as it was designed to foster a citizenry affirmatively equipped for self-government.

(One com-

mentator has suggested that Brennan's structural model
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has given new life to First Amendment doctrine and
may help to revitalize such confused doctrines as
that of "public forum" and will have implications
beyond the courtroom issue.41)

Burger•s judgment

was more restrictive and, as far as the broader implications are concerned, would appear to allow that
those institutions which have been traditionally
open can remain so whereas those which have been
closed may possibly remain closed.

Justice Brennan's

model would allow a broader definition of a right of
access which may reach to areas not previously subject to an assertion of a right of access.
In regard to the courtroom, it is clear that
both believe that access must be contemporaneous.
Delayed review of recordings or transcriptions were
considered inadequate to serve and promote the purpose
of public evaluation and control over the judicial system.

Cold records do not faithfully reproduce the

subtleties of bias or dishonesty.

Also, the -quality

of discussion is highest when interest is highest and
interest is highest with contemporaneous access.
Having clearly,established constitutional bases
for a right of access to the courtroom and having
agreed that the right was not absolute, the Richmond
decision falls short at the point of clearly establishing the parameters of application.
41 "1979 term," pp. 154-155.
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As previously

noted, Brennan was particularly disturbed by the uncertainty of the standards for closure.

The Court

instructed the trial judge to tread softly, to provide
justification for any closure order, and then failed
to provide clear guidance for doing so.

The trial

judge knows only that the standard is less stringent
than the Nebraska prior restraint test even though
the practical effect of both gag and closure orders
is the same.

Out of this inconsistency, the trial

judge is left to weigh the effects of any order,
I

balance competing interests in favor of the "overriding"
ones, and risk being the subject of the next case in
which the Court may be willing to provide more definite standards and requirements.
In addition, the Court will ultimately have to
address the application of its First Amendment analysis to pre-trial suppression hearings and perhaps to
other pre-trial proceedings as well.

A trial judge

will certainly have to weigh the Richmond judgment
against the Gannett judgment before closing such a
proceeding.

He or she might conclude that some just-

ification may be required without having any basis for
judging how much.

A case in which the Richmond analy-

sis is applied to suppression hearings may represent
a more precise convergence of the fair trial - free
press and right of access issues than existed in the
Richmond case.
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CONCLUSION
It has been said that the case history of
the fair trial - free press issue has been long
and tortuous.

The interjection of the question

of public access has not' mitigated that condition.
Beginning with Nebraska on one side and Pell and
Saxbe on the other, the Burger Court shows signs
of being badly splintered and unable not only to
form a consensus but also to articulate one.
decisions are marked by pluralitiesr

These

for example,

the Nebraska decision had five opinions, the Gannett
decision had five opinions, and the Richmond decision
had seven separate opinions!
Archibald Cox has theorizedl that this Court
is marked and marred by an unwillingness on the part
of individual Justices to yield their personal preferences and by a desire by some to influence the
future by providing ·. separat·e analyses.

The result

is fragmentation and fractionalization which produces
1 Archibald Cox, "Freedom of Expression in the

Burger Court," Harvard L.R. 92:
(November 1980).
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decisions which are lacking in clarity, consistency,
and even practicality.

This condition may be attribut-

able to real differences so sharp as to be irreconcilable or it may be that several of the Justices are
afflicted with philosophical rigidity and injudicious
concern for personal prerogatives.

Cox has suggested

that the law clerk system in which clerks change annually has contributed to a lack of unity in philosophy and authorship.2

Woodward and Armstrong gave

evidence of that in The Brethren, but the law clerk
system is not peculiar to the Burger Court.

What

may be singularly characteristic of this Court is a
tendency of some Justices to require law clerks to
write in support of some preformed opinion.

Given

the semi-secret nature of Supreme Court deliberations,
such observations are partially speculative but are
not without support in any reading of the decisions
and the noting of extra-judicial statements by the
Justices themselves.
The Burger Court (and particularly the Chief
Justice) shows a reluctance to deviate from a cautious,
aase-by-case approach to issues.

In addition, there

is evidence of a desire to employ some judicial restraint in confining decisions to the narrow issues.
The paradox is that while doing so in relation to the
2

Cox, p. 72.
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judgments, the myriad opinion writing is characterized by a broad-swept engagement of multiple questions
which result in opinions marked by ambiguity and more
unanswered questions.

As aoonsequence, the decisions

are incoherent, fail to square with previous rulings
in some instances, and fail to maintain "an evergrowing yet continuous body of law."}

If the pattern

continues, not only is the Burger Court likely to suffer from diminished influence but the rule of law
will suffer as well.
In summary, the Supreme Court of the United States
has recognized an independent right of aceess for the
public and press to trials in the First Amendment.
It has denied the existence of such a right of access
to pre-trial proceedings in the Sixth Amendment but
has yet to address the question of access to pre-trial
proceedings in the First Amendment.

If and when it

does so, it must consider the various kinds of pretrial proceedings and differentiate them in congruence
with its reasoning in the Richmond case.
The right of access to the courtroom is not considered absolute.

C~osure

of courtrooms is still a

possibility, under certain circumstances, but the
standards and requirements for keeping courts open or
allowing their closure are unclear.
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(Though not at

issue in this study, the Richmond decision also
leaves open the question of how far beyond the
courtroom this right of access may extend and how
much access will fulfill the constitutional requirements for an informed, self-governing people.)
Multiple opinions, representing a divergence
of rationale and theory, are the norm in both the
fair trial

~

free press cases and the access cases.

Clearly, the issues in these cases are difficultJ
First Amendment questions always produce differences
of opinion and ·pointed debate.

Nevertheless, these

are crucial issues in a free society and the highest
Court in the nation has an obligation to produce
rulings that are definitive, firm, and understandable.
In dealing with the issue of a public right of access
to the courtroom, it has failed to do so.
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